To put it at its simplest, Russian strategic culture-that is, its broad understanding of what poses a threat and under what circumstances it should turn to coercion and war-ensures that it considers the Baltic states, for all their small size and essentially defensive posture, as a challenge, as well as an opportunity. The extent to which the Kremlin’s perspective on the Baltic States is shaped by Russia’s distinctive strategic culture and the current regime’s operational code are clear. Neither is the true aim instead Russia seeks leverage outside the region rather than within and considers the Baltic states a theater in every sense, in which offensive intent can be signaled and offensive capabilities demonstrated without leading to open conflict. Traditionally, the debate about Russia’s objectives in the region has been about whether it seeks outright territorial expansion or merely political influence. As one recently retired Russian general staff officer noted, when asked about the state of contingency planning for such operations, “the trouble with the Baltic States is that they are full of Balts,” in other words, in his eyes, a feisty, contrary people who have already shown the will and capacity to resist under overwhelming odds. Furthermore, Moscow appears to understand how unwelcome and dangerous direct intervention would be, over and above bringing Russia into direct conflict with NATO. However, they show no enthusiasm now for exchanging membership of prosperous, democratic European states for Kremlin rule. 1īefore the worsening of Russia-Western relations in 2014, the Russian speakers of Narva, Estonia, and Riga, Latvia, in particular, were willing to leverage their sense of being excluded and neglected in the name of mobilizing constituencies for political impact. Lithuanian president Dalia Grybauskaitė may warn that “the likelihood is high if we don't constantly defend ourselves,” but there is no serious evidence of Russian territorial ambitions in the region. On the other hand, it is less clear what Moscow’s limits and goals are. That the Baltic states are under constant Russian pressure is undeniable, from official denunciations to unofficial disinformation and from overt shows of military strength to covert intelligence operations. The Vladimir Putin regime’s operational code inclines it to respond with multiple, varied, and often independent covert political means. Russia considers the independence of the Baltic states and their active role in NATO and the EU as threats to Russia’s security, sovereignty, and autonomy.Rather, Russia uses the Baltic states to exert leverage against a variety of other actors, including the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the neutral Nordic states (e.g., Sweden), and even Belarus. The Baltic states are considered targets not because the Russians believe that these states can be returned to Russia’s sphere of influence-indeed, Russians lost that belief long ago.The Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) are coming under constant, multi-vector Russian pressure, yet, rather than a prelude to kinetic operations, this pressure is part of Moscow’s wider “political war” with the West. Masters Program in International Security Studies - MISS.Fellows / Joint Professional Military Education - JPME.Seminar in Irregular Warfare/Hybrid Threats (SIWHT).Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS).Program on Cyber Security Studies (PCSS).
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